Calculation of control vs. cash flow rights 10

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In a pyramid structure, the difference between voting rights (control) and cash flow rights depends on the length of the holding chain. For example, the parent company at the top of the tower owns 50% of the equity of its subordinate company A, and company A is the controlling shareholder.

It owns 40% of the equity of Company B, and Company B, as the controlling shareholder, owns 30% of the equity of Company C. Such a vertical structure forms the "parent company - company A (subsidiary) - company B (grandson company) - company C (great-grandson).

company)" such a four-level control chain. Follow Claessens et al(2000), the parent company's control over Company C as the ultimate controller will be reflected in the weakest link in the control chain (30%), therefore, its voting rights (control) can be quantified as 30%, and in terms of cash flow rights, the parent company's dividend income rights from Company C will be quantified as 50%*40%*30%=6%, which is the cash flow right of the ultimate controller in the holding chain to Company C.

According to the previous question: China National Petroleum and Natural Gas.

The ultimate control of the group company over Jinan Diesel shares is: 60%+ The topic you gave is not wrong, right?? That is, 100% control;

The cash flow right of China National Petroleum Corporation to Jinan Diesel Co., Ltd. is: 100%*100%*60%+100%*;

Excuse me, did you find this picture in **.

Summary. What is the system in which A has control over D and cash flow rights?

What is the system in which A has control over D and cash flow rights?

Summary. The separation of control and cash flow rights is based on the idea that the ultimate controller's quantitative control over the listed company is not equal to the quantitative cash flow rights it enjoys.

In general, the ultimate controller's control is greater than or equal to the cash flow right. This definition first emphasizes the ultimate controller, because generally speaking, only when the ultimate controller realizes that the chain of control over the listed company is long enough to separate the control and cash flow rights, and there will be no separation of the two rights for the superior shareholders of the listed company; In the control realization model of direct control by natural persons, the controller directly controls the listed company, and there is no separation between the control and the cash flow right.

Hello. The separation of the right to control the source of income and the right to cash flow is the idea: the ultimate controller has an asymmetry between the quantitative control of the listed company and the quantitative cash flow right enjoyed.

In general, the ultimate controller's control is greater than or equal to the cash flow right. This definition first emphasizes the ultimate controller, because generally speaking, only when the ultimate controller realizes that the control chain of the listed company is long enough to separate the control and cash flow rights, and the upper shareholders of the listed company will not regret the separation of the two powers; In the control realization model of direct control by natural persons, the controller directly controls the listed company, and there is no separation between the split control and the cash flow right.

Just see your question now!

In a pyramid structure, the difference between voting rights (control) and cash flow rights depends on the length of the holding chain. For example, the parent company located at the top of the tower owns 50% of the equity of its subordinate company A, while Company A Yuannian owns 40% of the equity of Company B as the controlling shareholder, and Company B owns 30% of the equity of Company C as the controlling shareholder. Such a vertical structure forms a four-level control chain of "parent company - company A (subsidiary) - company B (grandson company) - company C (great-grandson company)".

Follow Claessens et al(2000), the parent company's control over Company C as the ultimate controller will be reflected in the weakest link in the control chain (30%), therefore, its voting rights (control) can be quantified as 30%, and in terms of cash flow rights, the parent company's dividend income rights from Company C will be quantified as 50%*40%*30%=6%, which is the cash flow right of the ultimate controller in the holding chain to Company C.

According to the above question: China National Petroleum Corporation's ultimate control over Jinan Diesel Co., Ltd. **** is: 60%+ The title you gave is not wrong, right?? That is, 100% control; Hail search.

The cash flow right of China National Petroleum Corporation to Jinan Diesel Co., Ltd. is: 100%*100%*60%+100%*;

In a pyramid structure, the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights depends on the length of the holding chain.

For example, the parent company at the top of the tower owns 50% of the equity of its subordinate company A, while company A, as the controlling shareholder, owns 40% of the equity of company B, and company B, as the controlling shareholder, owns 30% of the equity of company C. Such a longitudinal structure forms a four-level control chain of "parent company - company A (subsidiary) - company B (Sun Gongyu Chang slag division) - company C (great-grandson company)".

Follow Claessens et al(2000), the parent company's control over Company C as the ultimate controller will be reflected in the weakest link in the chain of control (30%), therefore, its voting rights (control) can be quantified as 30%, and in terms of cash flow rights, the dividend income rights obtained by the parent company from Company C will be quantified as 50%*40%*30%=6%, which is the cash flow right of the ultimate controller in the holding chain to Company C.

According to the above question, the ultimate control of China National Petroleum Corporation over Jinan Diesel Shares **** is: 60%+

That is, 100% control.

The cash flow right of China National Petroleum Corporation to Jinan Diesel Co., Ltd. is: 100%*100%*60%+100%*;