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Therefore, the disadvantages of fiscal decentralization can lead to tax competition between jurisdictions, which provides opportunities for some enterprises, especially those with great influence. They can ask the local authorities for more favourable tax treatment even under a uniform tax standard. As for the bunch of investment schemes, the preferential tax policy clearly stood out and led to the tieboutian migration in 1956 with the aim of reducing taxes (this is your technical term, I don't know what it means).

However, asset specificity (proposed by William 1985), such as land, manpower, and dedicated assets, can cause lock-in effects and discourage firms from exiting a location. Thus, in addition to this method of voting with feet, Hirschman (1970) mentions in his book Exit, Voice and Loyalty that voting with voice is also an option. Due to the complexity and uncertainty of China's business environment, this approach is not manifested as a complaint or a personal relationship between the entrepreneur and the maker and the executive who formulates and implements policy, as in the West, but rather because of its dependence on politics, which is particularly important for success.

It focuses on mutual and long-term partnerships, and therefore requires the exchange of benefits and a significant investment of money, time and energy to cultivate, maintain and develop. (yang, 1994; 2002; boisot and child, 1996; luo, 1997)。Therefore, quitting halfway or making bad remarks will breed losses and risks, and a reasonable industrialist will give cost-benefit calculations and responses to make choices.

But to what extent is the opt-out option better than words, and vice versa? Under what conditions should the two be used interchangeably? Is it possible to use both options at the same time?

What systems will help with exit strategy or speech strategy?

For the sake of these questions, and to apply and extend the exit-speech theory (a proper noun, please judge for yourself), we build a model of the mutual response between enterprises and ** from the perspective of the two for preferential tax policies, and reveal ways for smart entrepreneurs to reduce transaction costs. The rest will be done as follows. The next section presents a comparison of exit and voice theory with Hirschman's initial revelations.

Sections 3 and 4 will introduce the basic and advanced models mentioned above, followed by some practical examples. In the last section, we will draw conclusions.

Thus, the de facto fiscal decentralization generalizes the internal jurisdiction of tax competition, thus opening up an opportunity for companies, especially those with great influence, to negotiate tax incentives with the local **, despite facing a more difficult unification.

1. Standardize the tax policy. For most investment strategies, incentive tax incentives are significantly prominent and others induce partial relocation of companies (1956) as less tax burden. However, asset specificity (Williamson, 1985) favors specificity, material and human asset specificity, and specialized assets may also have a lock-in effect and make exports less attractive.

Thus, in addition to such a "vote with feet", the alternative is Voice Hirschman (1970) placed in his influential book Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Unlike it's common things that happen in complaining or Western countries for entrepreneurs to be personally related and responsible for decision-making or execution. Embedded in a complex, uncertain and unpredictable business environment in China, the success of this politically connected business is crucial.

It highlights reciprocal, long-term relationships that require the exchange of interest and substantial input on the means of money, time, and effort to cultivate, maintain, and expand (Yang, 1994; Boisot and Child, 2002, 1996; Luo, 1997). Therefore, because both have the right to increase the cost and risk of export and sound, the reasonable choice of the entrepreneur makes the cost-benefit analysis of the ground response**. However, to what extent will the exit choose to transcend the sound option and vice versa.

Under what conditions will they remain or choose each other? Will they work together as a hybrid strategy? Can Institutions Promote Exports and Voices?

In order to solve the problem and operate and extend the theory of sound rejection, we construct a game model of the interaction between the company and the local ** entry, from the sound of tax incentives, revealing the dynamics of the two options in a reasonable entrepreneurial transaction cost savings. The rest will continue as follows. In the next section, the original account of the exit and sound conceptualization of Hirschman is compared.

The 3rd and 4th rationale and current extended model of the Acoustic Row Games Company with the results of the local ** and balance, followed by some empirical cases. The final section concludes.