Why is Li De s military ability so vegetable?

Li De studied at the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union for 3 years, but he only had experience in street and street fighting, regardless of China's national conditions, regardless of the actual situation of the war, only relying on the rules and regulations in the textbook, sitting in the house and directing the battle according to the map, and at the same time having the physique of the domineering president of the Yellow Sect, don't think about it, as long as I feel it, don't listen to other people's advice.

Let me tell you the truth, Li De's military ability is not too good, after all, he was able to struggle down in the Kuomintang army, which was several times his own strength, although he was responsible for the failure of the anti-encirclement and suppression and the great weakening of the strength of the Red Army, but the army under his command in the course of the operation was still organized, and there was no record of defeat, and the military content of Li De's lectures in the early classes of military geniuses like a group of early leaders (including Taizu) was affirmed.

But his advantages did not cover up his shortcomings at all, first, a good class does not mean that the war will be fought well, China's national conditions and practice are not quite consistent with what he quoted from the classics in class, but he himself did not change it, he still acted according to the rules and regulations he learned, and took the Soviet Union's set of rigid copy; Second, although he came out of the Frunze Military Academy, he didn't have much actual combat experience, and he was not a senior general, and even he came to China to participate in the rescue. Third, the conditions around him are not very good, the level is not high, and the opponent's strength is much stronger than him on paper (but Li may be really stronger than the bandit generals under the chairman at that time), which is equivalent to a person with 60 points to take the test with 80 points, do you think he can do it?

Later, after being given military power and severely criticized by Taizu and other leaders, Li De actually realized that he couldn't do it, and in his future, whether it was in his memoirs or in class, he still praised Taizu and others' military command and tactical ability, much stronger than Bogu Wang Ming, one at least knew his own food, and the other did not admit it.

Discarding the idea of guerrilla warfare, the direct confrontation of the enemy's strength and our weakness consumed the Red Army, and the base areas were seriously compressed and surrounded, and if they did not break through, there would be a danger of annihilation of the whole army.

Li De was not a military adviser to the Comintern faction at all, and the military adviser was later appointed by Wang Ming. To say that they are dogmatism is a bit sorry for the concept of dogmatism, and I even think that these people are speculating in revolution and harboring evil intentions!

There have been two. The former's name is Xiao Yuehua, and he will divorce in the future.

Xiao Yuehua was awarded the rank of colonel in 1955 and later transferred to the rank of deputy soldier. He served as director of the Military Law Division of the Hunan Provincial Military Region, director of the Office of the Provincial Department of Communications, and member of the Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He died in Guangzhou on November 3, 1983.

Later, he married Li Lilian. Li Lilian later served as a teaching assistant in the ** Department of Lu Xun Art Institute in Yan'an, and participated in the Yan'an Literature and Art Symposium. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, she served as the head of the Children's Affairs Department and the International Liaison Department of the All-China Women's Federation.

He died in Beijing in April 1965.

Li De did not adopt the strategy of "encircling the countryside from the city", but after several defeats in mobile operations of the Red Army, he adopted the strategy of "fortress to fortress, pillbox to pillbox; The strategy of "front-to-battle line plus short-term assault" was due to the fact that the commanders of the Red Army could not make good use of the short-term assault tactics except for the first line, and the overall anti-encirclement and suppression campaign failed. The rules of the war game are that if the stronger side does not make a mistake, it can completely defeat the weaker side. Because the veteran summed up the experience of the previous times and adopted the tactics of Zhengkeqi, according to the strength of the ** Red Army at that time, even if there was no Li De, if he did not break through, he would be able to survive for a period of time at most, and eventually it was inevitable that the whole army would be annihilated.

Li De was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. In fact, the real reason why the Red Army was able to break through was the strategic transfer strategy made by the Red Army and its intelligence network, and the three-man regiment, including it, as well as the use of discord to make the warlords suspicious and open the net.

This can also be supported by the situation in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base areas. At that time, the fighters of the Red Fourth Front Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area were more brilliant than those of the Red First Army, and the frequency of being encircled and suppressed was also higher than that of the **Soviet area [when it was encircled and suppressed for the fourth time, the Soviet area had just begun the third encirclement and suppression], and Lao Chiang's reward for the leaders of the Red Fourth Front Army was also higher than that of Zhu Maopeng of the Red First Army. However, without Li De in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui, the Red Fourth Front Army was still forced to move out of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area.

At that time, Lao Jiang had to deal with the Red Fourth first, followed by the Gui warlords, and the third was the **Soviet District, which was also a secondary consideration to the **Soviet District, and the Red Clothes could be tossed for so long. When he finished dealing with the Red Si and Gui systems in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, he concentrated on dealing with the Red One in the **Soviet District, and the Red One couldn't stay in the **Soviet District.

The key point is that Li De does not understand the situation in China, nor does he understand military tactics. Li De one-sidedly emphasized the importance of land in the defense of the territory, believing that every inch of land should be fought for. And in fact, we can take advantage of the geography and annihilate the enemy in motion.

Sun Tzu said, "Ease and work, fatigue and strike.""Only by making full use of all favorable conditions can we win.

As a result, in the positional battle of Li De, one city and one pool, our Red Army suffered heavy losses.

As a result, the Red Army's fifth anti-encirclement campaign failed and was forced to transfer its base area Li De adopted the Soviet Red Army's practice [that is, the cities surrounded the countryside] and insisted on attacking the cities, resulting in the Red Army's heavy losses. Forced to go on the Long March.

Adventurism in offense and conservatism in defense. It is an underestimation of difficulties in advance, blind optimism and underestimation of the enemy; Halfway through, they will not improvise, dogmatic adventurism prevails; After the fact (after the defeat), the feeling of defeat spreads, and it is easy to breed conformism and escapism.

Harm: Seriously jeopardizing the cause of the Chinese revolution.

See homework again, isn't the TV series "Red Cradle" very clear!!