Why does Frege think truth cannot be replaced by facts?

Frege, his idea is different, he believes that the truth cannot be replaced by the facts, the true value, the true value.

The reason why Frege thinks that disputes cannot be replaced by facts is because Frege is a more rigorous person, and he believes that only science is the most important.

Because there are many facts that are no substitute for truth. We should live more realistically.

Why does Frege think that value-added cannot be scored by facts? This may depend on his actual situation and knowledge to determine his facts.

The main thing is that he has a different opinion, he doesn't approve of other things.

In fact, it is possible to replace, but you should also pay attention when replacing.

Convinced, not if you want to replace it with the real one, you can still find their corresponding payment, if you can't find it, he may have other problems.

Here is not applied, practical, the standard of substitution is very good for a particular art.

Come on, why be serious, just don't use the truth to tell the truth, because he is a little better at identifying politics.

I'm still serious about his sincerity, and we can't replace it with the real one, and I think this is also very necessary, now.

Because he was in that house some didn't deserve it, so he thought of his own thoughts.

Fig Langepo asked seriously, "Is the value of ten, the substitution is very simple and very important, and it feels very methodical."

Fraser because. I don't think it's right to think that truth can't be replaced by facts.

Why did Freig seriously not need to replace it with his own facts, but could directly replace it?

Because there are a wide range of countries or regions where English is spoken!

A prime example of this is this:

If there is such a proposition c: a b, then we follow the following truth table: a b c

to determine the true value of a b.

Idea 1 is to think that a b is just an operation and has nothing to do with its representation, that is, it looks the same as an operation like a + b, a b, etc., both of the f(a,b) type.

If this is the way of thinking, then it means that this kind of truth value is prescribed, then there is nothing to say, of course, it does not reflect any relationship.

Actually, we want to discover the factual value of this kind of operation, that is, it reflects a relationship.

Idea 2 is to think that the truth value of a b can be explained as follows:

Assuming that A is true, then it is sufficient to detect whether B is false, and if B is false, then the truth value of C:A B is 0 (the argument is not credible).

Conversely, if a is false, then there is no way to verify, so the default truth value of a b is 1 (which is acceptable).

The original words in the book are like this:

P: "The weather is good. Q: "I'll pick you up." ”

p q: "If the weather is good, then I'll pick you up." ”

When the weather is good, I went to pick you up, and at this time p q is true; When the weather is good, I don't pick you up, then p q off. When the weather is bad, I don't break my promise to pick you up or not, and it's appropriate to decide that P Q is appropriate.

When the weather is good, I went to pick you up, and at this time p q is true; When the weather is good, I don't pick you up, then p q off. When the weather is bad, I don't keep my promise whether I go or don't pick you up, and I don't think it's reasonable to do so at this time.

Why is it that a deep American breath, I don't know if it is, is that "all have not fulfilled their promises" are valued, and the symmetrical "have not broken their promises" is ignored, will there be this feeling of "showing one-way strength for the sake of emphasizing justice and justice, but it is a little breathless"? ）

The question then arises: why is the emphasis on "the 1s and 0s used in p and q "true" and "false", while p q needs to be understood as "proposition acceptable" and "proposition untrustworthy"?

From the graph, it feels more like inclusion (p-q) and is trying to tangle with the question of whether to equivalently express the non-p part.

In other words, is it possible to have expressions (1, true), (0, false), (1, accept), (0, not accept)?

The teacher said that this is not a category that needs to be discussed in propositional logic, but this kind of conceptual problem should be taken seriously in practical application.

Wittgenstein was a leading exponent of the linguistic school. His philosophy is mainly the study of language, and he wants to reveal what happens when people communicate, when they express themselves. He argues that the essence of philosophy is language.

Language is the expression of human thought, the foundation of the entire civilization, and the essence of philosophy can only be found in language. He dissolved the singular essence of traditional metaphysics and found a new direction for philosophy. His major works, Treatise on Logic and Philosophy and Philosophical Studies, respectively represent two stages of philosophical systems in his life.

The former is mainly deconstruction, making philosophy a linguistic problem, philosophy must face language directly, "everything that can be said, can be said clearly, and everything that cannot be said, should be silent", philosophy is nothing more than to explain the problem clearly. The latter returns philosophy to philosophy, and after deconstruction, it is constructed, and it is impossible to create a strict language that can express philosophy, because the language of everyday life is endless, which is the foundation and source of philosophy, so the essence of philosophy should be solved in daily life, and the game should be understood in "games".

"The first task of philosophy is to analyze language" is a loud slogan, and analytic philosophy has become the most dominant philosophical trend. With the development of analytic philosophy, the philosophy of language came into being. Some people believe that there is no difference between the philosophy of language and analytic philosophy, while others say that the philosophy of language is the core content of analytic philosophy.

In any case, they are completely consistent when it comes to analyzing language.

It is worth noting, however, that the analysis emphasized by analytic philosophy and philosophy of language is not an arbitrary analysis, but a logical analysis, specifically an analysis that is mainly carried out using the methods of modern logic. Think about it, why does Frege say that the meaning of a sentence is its thought, and the meaning of a sentence is its truth? Why did Russell think that the meaning of a sentence containing a glossary is actually expressed by three sentences, and that the latter contains expressions such as "at least one" and "at most one"?

Why did Wittgenstein start from the facts to the world, and then reduce the facts to sentences, thus the universal form of sentences, and finally think: silence about the unspeakable? Why does Quinn say that existence is the value of variables?

Why did Kripke criticize Frege and Russell's theories of proper names and facsimiles, arguing that they did not consider the situation in the possible world? Why did Dammett think that the theory of meaning is made up of a theory of meaning and a theory of referent? Why did Davidson think that his theory of meaning was a theory of truth based on Tarski's theory?

And all that. All of these are very important questions in the philosophy of language, but they all have a very deep logical background and ideas behind them. If we analyze them carefully and deeply, we will find that what is reflected in these problems is not a simple and superficial linguistic analysis, but a profound and authentic logical analysis.

Because Popper's anti-plagiarism attacked Ma's, and Ma's is the unquestioned religious leader of our dynasty, I have a lot of doubts about Popper in all kinds of unreliable ways.

This article is an example of this:

By observing, we can make factual judgments.

For example: there is one white swan, there are two white swans. This is called a singular proposition, but, according to scientific theory, it is a mononomial proposition.

For example: all swans are white.

That's where our logical syllogism comes into play:

If an animal is a swan, all the swans are white, and all the animals are white.

The difference between an all-name proposition and a singular proposition is that a hollistic proposition is uncountable, and a singular proposition is countable.

Falsifiability is a very clear criterion for dividing science from non-science.

If a theory is falsifiable, then it is science."

It's too much, too lazy to complain.

The true value is a number with a maximum of 1, so it cannot appear at 1 point. Equivalent to 1 percent.